Rejuvenating 'old Europe':Towards a strategy for reindustrialisation and sustainable competitiveness by Pitelis, C.N.
        
Citation for published version:
Pitelis, CN 2014, 'Rejuvenating 'old Europe': Towards a strategy for reindustrialisation and sustainable
competitiveness', Contributions to Political Economy, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 69-98.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cpe/bzu009
DOI:
10.1093/cpe/bzu009
Publication date:
2014
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Rejuvenating ‘Old Europe’ – Towards a Strategy for Reindustrialisation 
and Sustainable Competitiveness  
 
 
 
Christos N. Pitelis 
School of Management, University of Bath 
Email: 
cnp27@bath.ac.uk 
  
 
 
 
 
January 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rejuvenating ‘Old Europe’ – Towards a Strategy for Reindustrialisation 
 and Sustainable Competitiveness * 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We draw on the theory and practice of international competitiveness and Developmental 
Industrial Policy (DIP), in order to propose a strategy for reindustrialisation and sustainable 
European international competitiveness. We suggest that European policy makers should take 
stock of shifts in the global landscape and leverage ideas from business strategy to build 
sustainable competitive advantage, but in a way that also fosters system-wide economic 
sustainability. We propose business strategy-inspired specific measures to achieve this, based 
on an integration of some commonly perceived “dichotomies” in extant debates on DIPs, but 
also submit that the path to European economic rejuvenation will remain fragile and 
precarious, as long as the requisite institutional and organisational infrastructure is not in 
place, and wider structural and policy challenges of modern market economies, notably 
embedded power structures and corruption, are not properly addressed.     
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“Is the reason we all talk so much about growth that we understand so little about it?” 
(Rodrik, 2005, p.1009) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Europe is at a crossroads. The financial, sovereign debt and economic crisis, and their 
potential implications for growth, has rendered “growth talk”, the order of the day among 
academic economists, policy-makers, and journalists
1
. A problem with much of such “talk”, 
at least in academic circles, is that it focuses mostly on macroeconomics and macroeconomic 
policy, at the expense of micro-economic, supply-side factors and micro-economic policy, 
such as Developmental Industrial Policy (DIP).  
  
The recent success of countries such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which 
have relied on “State Capitalism” and supply-side DIPs, has helped contribute to renewed 
interest on the role of the state and industrial policy (IP), in economic development. DIP is a 
“dirty word” no more: it is quite openly entertained in fora, such as The Economist and the 
Time magazine. In the latter, for instance, Fareed Zakaria observed that IP is so clearly 
successful in so many countries, that perhaps we should employ it, despite the fact that we 
lack a supporting theory.
2
 While useful in recognising the need for micro-economic policy, 
we claim below that such statements fail to acknowledge that there is a body of 
theoretical/conceptual ideas behind DIP – it is just not the neoclassical economics one. 
  
Our paper revisits the issues of international competitiveness and DIPs with an eye to 
devising a European strategy for rejuvenation and sustainable international competitiveness. 
It draws on both neoclassical and classical economics, and it submits that nations, like 
business, should be after the sustainable capture of co-created value. Accordingly national 
public policies would benefit from ideas and tools borrowed from business strategy. We also 
suggest, however, that, unless modern capitalism addresses the problem of embedded and 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Aghion et al. (2011), McFadden (2012), The Economist, 5
th
 of May 2012, “Going for growth, 
but how?”, 12th of May 2012, “Ode to Growth” and 21st September “The new Intervention”,  EC (2010, 2011), 
Warwick (2013).. 
2
 See F. Zakaria’s article in TIME magazine on “The case for making it in the USA”, published on February 6th, 
2012. 
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concentrated power structures (hence corruption in its broad sense), the sustainable economic 
rejuvenation of Europe, and more widely Western economies, will remain elusive and fragile.   
 
The next section revisits debates on international competitiveness. It critically assesses extant 
perspectives, points to their limitations and proposes a novel meta-classical synthesis and 
extension. The following section revisits DIP, in theory and practice, focusing on the case of 
Europe.  Following on from these, we provide an agenda for a business strategy-informed 
sustainable European international competitiveness that leverages the aforementioned ideas, 
in the context of new conceptual thinking and shifts in the global landscape. The last section 
concludes and discusses limitations 
    
II. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND DIPS 
 
IIa. Extant Perspectives on International Competitiveness  
 
“International Competitiveness” is an elusive and controversial concept. Paul Krugman 
(1994) has famously lamented the “dangerous obsession” of policy-makers with “national 
competitiveness”. For him “competitiveness” makes sense at the level of firms, but not 
nations. In his view the best way to improve nation-wide economic performance is through 
increasing Total Factor Productivity (TFP). 
 
Krugman’s argument is unconvincing for various reasons. First, there is no inherent reason 
why one should not be able to define international competitiveness. In a generic sense, 
“competitiveness” can be taken to refer to the ability of any economic entity to outperform its 
“peers”, in terms of what is commonly perceived as a shared objective. For example, if the 
objective is higher growth of per capita GDP, a country that outperforms others in terms of 
this objective in a sustainable way, can be defined as more internationally “competitive”. 
This can be achieved through rivalristic actions (such as strategic trade neo-protectionist 
policies), co-operative actions (such as knowledge exchange-transfer), a combination of the 
two, or even without much interaction with other countries; a country can, theoretically at 
least, outperform its peers in this definition, without even engaging in trade if its performance 
in terms of the commonly pursued objective is superior to that of other countries. Such a 
generic definition can be, and often is, applicable to individuals, firms, regions, and even 
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universities and courses. What changes are the peer group and thus the “perceived as shared 
objective”.  
 
A second important limitation of Krugman’s argument, shared by many economists of many 
persuasions, is that it presumes that value creation achieved through efficiency/TFP will 
always be translated to value capture. There is no guarantee for this, as all business knows so 
well.  In some cases value created by an inventor-innovator, is either not realised due to lack 
of demand and/or is captured by competitors with complementary assets and capabilities 
(Teece, 1986; Pitelis, 2009a). We take up this important issue later. 
 
In brief, one can distinguish four major extant frameworks on international competitiveness 
and DIPs: the neoclassical economic theory-based-Washington consensus, the Japanese-Far 
Eastern practice-based approach with the more recently discussed “Beijing Consensus”, the 
“systems of innovation”/“varieties of capitalism” perspective, and Michael Porter’s work on 
the Competitive Advantage/“Diamond” of Nations. These tend to overlap on some aspects, 
but are usually presented as separate in extant literature (see Pitelis, 1998, 2009a). 
 
The neoclassical theory of international competitiveness focuses first on nation-wide growth 
fostered by appropriate international trade. “Growth theory” goes back to the landmark 
contribution of Solow (1956), in which capital and labour could be argued to explain circa 
30% of growth, with circa 70% attributed to “exogenous” technological change. More 
recently, the “endogenous growth” theory, with important contributions by Lucas, (1988) and 
Romer (1986, 1990), aimed to capture the endogenous role of “technical change”, human 
capital, and “increasing returns”; see Solow (2000) and Fine (2000) for critical assessments. 
Suffice it to note that neither Solow (from a mainstream neoclassical), nor Fine (from a 
heterodox) perspective, respectively, is impressed with the conceptual, empirical and policy 
implications of the new theory.   
  
In international trade, neoclassical theory built on the idea of Ricardo (1817) that free trade, 
based on comparative productivity-related advantages can benefit all nations. The Heckscher, 
Ohlin, Samuelson (HES) model relied on comparative advantage (abundance) in factor 
endowments, and supported the Ricardian  prescription for free trade, under conditions of 
non-increasing returns; see Samuelson (1962). More recently, “new trade” theorists, such as 
Krugman (1987, 1989), questioned the predictions of the HES model, for situations involving 
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imperfect competition, increasing returns, spill-over effects, and first-mover advantages. In 
such cases, Krugman showed that strategic trade policies in support of some sectors and firms 
could  favour a nation that employs them (Krugman, 1992). On the other hand, however, such 
policies were said to be prone to conflicts over the division of benefits, and plagued by the 
possibility of “government failures” (in identifying the right sectors/firms), as well as 
retaliations by other nations-trade wars. These could lead to lose-lose situations (Boltho and 
Allsopp, 1987).
3
  
 
The “endogenous growth” and “new trade” theories reinvented ideas from post-Keynesian  
scholars such as Kaldor (1970), Robinson (1977),  Pasinetti (1974, 2009), and earlier List 
(1845); see Freeman (2004), Pitelis (2012b). Unlike these last mentioned authors, however, 
the theories of their modern counterparts are arguably ill-equipped to deal with the creative 
role of markets (as opposed to their allocative functions, once they exist), and with resource 
creation, not just through efficient allocation of “scarce” resources (Pasinetti, 2009, Pitelis, 
2012c). This weakens their usefulness in providing policy prescriptions; see Audretsch 
(1989), North (1994), Amsden (1997), Nelson and Winter (2002), Kaldor (1972), Freeman 
(2004), Rodrik (2005), and more recently Coase (2012).  
 
Macroeconomic policy prescriptions deriving from the conceptual foundations of the 
neoclassical economics perspective have been encapsulated in variants of the so-called 
Washington and post-Washington Consensus. These emphasize the role of free markets, free 
trade, privatisation and deregulation; see Williamson (1990). Their record has been 
questionable; see Stiglitz (2001), Rodrik (2005), Serra and Stiglitz (2008), Cowling and 
Tomlinson (2011). For Stiglitz (2001), this approach to development, “misunderstands the 
nature of the transformation itself – a transformation of society, not just of the economy” (p. 
xiv). 
 
A second approach on international competitiveness is that adopted by the Japanese 
government during the post-World War II reconstruction, by the “tiger” economies of East 
Asia, and more recently by China. Hence the approach can be defined as the “Japanese/ East 
Asian” (Pitelis, 2007).  
                                                 
3
 In the case of high adjustment costs, characterizing the case of inter-industry trade, these problems could be 
accentuated; see Krugman (1989, 1992), Deraniyagala and Fine (2001). 
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An important characteristic of the Japanese/East Asian approach, was the developmental 
industrial policy (DIP) of the state in partnership with business, and with the explicit aim to 
restructure the economy and create competitive advantages, as opposed  to solely  leveraging 
existing comparative ones (Lin and Chang, 2009). Elements of the industrial competitiveness 
strategies of Japan, devised and implemented by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI, formerly known as Ministry of International Trade and Industry- MITI), 
included the targeting and support of specific firms and sectors, perceived to be important in 
terms of high value-added, high income elasticity of demand, and oligopolistic structures 
with high profit margins. These were protected from international competition through 
managed-trade policies. Intra-sector competition was managed too, in that in each sector the 
major players should be not too many in order to allow for critical mass and reduce resource 
dissipation, but not too few either, so as to avoid collusive practices and engender workable 
competition. In effect, that was managed, locally-based big-business competition. To ensure 
the flow of technology in the absence of foreign direct investment (FDI), which was 
discouraged, MITI pursued a policy of buying licenses from foreign firms. To foster 
competition for big players, hence a more level-playing field, MITI required that firms 
purchasing licences would make them accessible to smaller players; see Johnson (1982), Best 
(1990),  Pitelis (1994, 1998), Freeman (2004), Cowling and Tomlinson, (2011). 
 
In addition to the above state-orchestrated policies, Japanese firms pursued a strategy of 
growth and market share acquisition, not short-term profit/“shareholder value” maximisation, 
in the expectation that through scale, learning and increasing returns, they could eventually 
outperform their western “rivals” (Best, 1990).  Additional characteristics of this approach 
included innovative business practices, for example just-in-time, life time employment, 
worker participation and total quality management. These have been widely discussed in 
literature and were felt by many scholars to have contributed to the remarkable performance 
of the Japanese economy, up to the late 1980s, when it was leading global markets in sectors 
such as electronics, semiconductors and automotives; see Amsden (1989), Shapiro and 
Taylor (1990), Wade (1990), Aoki (1990), Grabowski (1994),  Freeman (2004). 
 
Variants of the Japanese approach were adopted by countries such as South Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore, and, more recently, by China (Chang, 1994; Nolan, 2001; Lin, 2011), as well 
as newer “tigers”, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia (Jomo et al., 1997), and Vietnam 
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(Chesier and Penrose, 2007). As compared to the Japanese approach, smaller economies, like 
Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia chose to encourage FDI, as much as practicable and in a 
way that was perceived to be aligned to the overall international competitiveness strategy 
(Pitelis, 1994; Jomo et al., 1997)
4
.  
 
The Chinese DIP arguably represents a synthesis and enrichment of previous experiences 
with the ubiquitous “Chinese characteristics”. For Rodrik (2005) this included institutional 
innovations that were seen as fit for purpose and worked up to a point (such as Town and 
Villages Enterprises), while for Lin (2011) it was the gradualist comparative advantage-
friendly approach that made the trick. No one questioned the use of DIPs by China, or its 
leveraging of “State Capitalism”, and its unprecedented in human history growth record. This 
is despite different views as to the extent to which the policy was comparative advantage-
following or defying (Lin and Chang, 2009). 
 
The apparent success of the Chinese approach, and its more recent influence in other 
emerging economies, notably in Africa, has led to talk of a “Beijing Consensus”, which is 
meant to be more pragmatic, experimental, business-like and arm’s length (for example 
without the “conditionality” imposed by Western countries and institutions. Despite 
criticisms, commentators across the board now widely recognize that the Chinese miracle is 
unlikely to have been effected without State Capitalism and DIPs (Rodrik, 2009; Lin and 
Chang, 2009; Cowling and Tomlinson, 2011). 
 
A third approach to international competitiveness includes contributions under the 
evolutionary, resource-capabilities and systems-based banners. Much of this has been 
encapsulated in the “systems of innovation”, agglomeration and clusters, and ‘varieties of 
capitalism’-related literature; see Lundvall (1988), Krugman (1991a,b), Nelson (1995), 
Freeman (1995, 2004), de la Mothe and Paquet (1997), Fagerberg et al (2005), Jackson and 
Deeg (2006), Lundvall (2007), Pitelis (2009b), Cimoli et al (2009). A characteristic of the 
evolutionary and systems-based views is a focus on intertemporal efficiency through 
innovation, alongside a belief that the latter is best promoted through big-business 
competition and systems-wide linkages and interactions (Freeman, 1995; Deeg, 2007). The 
                                                 
4
 For a more detailed-nuanced account of similarities and differences between the various East Asian countries, 
see Shapiro and Taylor (1990) and Rodrik (2005). For differences between older and newer “tigers”; see Jomo 
et al. (1997). 
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strength, or otherwise, of the innovation system depends on system-wide linkages and on 
government policies and institutions. Markets are but a part of the system. They need not be 
“perfectly competitive” – indeed, big business competition may well have innovation-
promoting advantages; see Nelson (1995), Nelson and Winter (2002). In addition, the 
existence and promotion of agglomeration and clusters by small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) is seen as a potent means to promote linkages, diversity, and innovation 
(Metcalfe 2003; Wignarajah, 2003; Fagerberg et al., 2005; Cowling and Tomlinson, 2011; 
Pitelis (2012a). 
 
While the “systems perspective” departs from neoclassical economics in that it focuses on the 
supply-side, production side of the economy and on micro-economic policies, it shares with 
neoclassical economic theory a focus on value creation through efficiency, at the expense of 
value realisation, and appropriation/capture. Hence it fails to pay attention to the possibility 
we mentioned that the potential benefits from innovation, efficiency and value creation need 
not always be realised in the market place due to lack of effective demand, and/or any 
realised benefits may not be captured by the innovators themselves (Teece, 1986, 2006; 
Pitelis, 2009b). 
  
The fourth approach to international competitiveness examined here avoids this problem.  
Michael Porter’s (1990) “Diamond” of National Competitive Advantage suggests that the 
coexistence of appropriate factor conditions, demand conditions, firm and industry structure 
and strategy, as well as related and supporting industries, engender a “Diamond” of economic 
success-international competitiveness. While many of the elements of the “Diamond” are 
present in extant works
5
, Porter added new insights, not least the role of demand, as well as 
business strategy and structure. Business strategy is important, as it can help shift focus to 
value capture (a main concern of firms), not just efficiency and value creation. 
 
To varying degrees, all approaches discussed so far fail to deal adequately with the issue of 
the interaction between value creation and value capture and the impact of value capture 
strategies on system-wide sustainability, and hence the sustainability of any competitive 
advantages enjoyed by the nations in question. We turn to this issue later.  
                                                 
5
 For example “factor conditions” in the HOS model, demand conditions in Vernon’s (1966) work on the 
“product life-cycle”, related and supporting industries in the works of Marshall (1920), and literature on clusters 
(see Best, 1990; Edquist, 2005; Pitelis, 2012a), industry structure and rivalry in Industrial Organisation (IO); see 
Tirole (1988). 
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IIb. Extant Perspectives on DIPs   
 
The precise definition of industrial policy (IP) has been and remains a matter of dispute 
(Pitelis, 1994. Warwick, 2013). This has not deterred the emergence and current revival of an 
extensive literature on the issue revisited briefly below. Generically, IP refers to a set of 
measures taken by a government that aim to influence the performance of firms, sectors, 
industries and clusters towards a desired objective, as well as the financial, human and 
organisational resources, organisational and contingency arrangements made, in order to 
implement this objective. IP originally referred to manufacturing, but this has gradually 
shifted, not least because of the increasing interdependence between manufacturing and 
services, and even agriculture (Rodrik, 2004). For instance, today firms such as IBM, Rolls 
Royce and Xerox, rely on their manufacturing expertise in order to provide specialist 
services. A number of agro-business clusters involve the co-location and complementarity of 
agricultural and manufacturing activities (Galvez-Nogales, 2010). In this context, we can 
define IP as public policy measures aiming to have an appreciable effect on the 
competitiveness of manufacturing, directly and/or through impacting on supporting and 
complementary activities and sectors. Developmental IP (DIP) in this context, also referred to 
as Industrial Strategy (IS), goes beyond IP, in that they involve purposive strategic intent, 
planning and actions by the public sector to shape, extend, create and co-create markets and 
ecosystems, as opposed to merely setting the “rules of the game” (institutional framework), 
or focusing on solving “market failures”. DIPS can even often help to create “market 
failures”, so as to foster a wider developmental perspective ( Pitelis, 1994; Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2011).  
 
Anti-trust in the USA, or competition policies (CPs), in the above context, refer to the stance 
governments adopt towards competition and co-operation (co-opetition) between firms, in 
sectors and clusters. The boundaries between industrial/competition-anti-trust, and other 
types of public policies such as technology, innovation, regional, structural, competitiveness 
and even macroeconomic, are not always obvious. The closest one can get to a demarcation 
line is arguably by referring to a government’s own perception of what it aims its IP, IS, or 
DIP and CP to be, alongside the underlying conceptual framework, purportedly informing 
this perception. This is usually hard to decipher, as it depends on the degree of sophistication, 
desired involvement, and clarity of the proposed measures. In cases such as the EU it also 
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depends on the degree of alignment between EU-wide and national IPs. While, for example, 
EU-wide IPs are rather sophisticated, as explained below, it is not always clear that national 
governments follow these, or are even aware of their existence.  For example this author has 
met on numerous occasions policy makers responsible for IP in their respective countries, 
who are very surprised to “find out” that a EU-wide IP is in place. This poses a special 
challenge. 
 
In mainstream “neoclassical” economics, the government’s objective is assumed to be the 
improvement of the welfare of its citizens, which is achieved when scarce resources are 
allocated efficiently. Classical and post-Keynesian economists instead paid attention to the 
objective of wealth creation. In their view, efficient resource allocation can lead to wealth 
creation, but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. For example wealth 
creation can also be achieved by different means, such as through innovation and market 
creation (Kaldor, 1970) – aspects downplayed by the neoclassical school.6 On the other hand, 
a country can manage to allocate its scarce resources efficiently, but fail to create new 
resources through innovation at the same pace as another country, which is not as good in 
resource allocation, but fares better in resource-wealth creation. Manufacturing is widely 
believed to be an important contributor to wealth creation, for reasons such as the high degree 
of tradability of its products, its positive link with technology, innovation and productivity 
growth, and even the close links between manufacturing and services (Kaldor, 1972; 
Amsden, 2008). For example, in the case of the British manufacturer Rolls Royce, over 50% 
of its revenues are now accounted for by their servicing of aircraft engines, while engines 
themselves are sold at near cost, to create lock-in and quasi-captive service recipients-
customers
7
. Important in such cases is that servicing requires manufacturing skills, 
knowledge and capabilities to start with – this renders the two inseparable in a fundamental, 
even definitional, manner, hence the emergence of terms such as “manuservices”. 
 
The dominant perspective on IP and CP among economists arguably remains the neoclassical 
IO-based one. In its context, competition is seen as a type of industry structure, which can be 
perfect (or contestable, Baumol, 1982), or imperfect. “Perfection” and “contestability” are 
defined in terms of price-taking behaviour; hence zero excess profits (Augier and Teece, 
2009). According to this view, monopolistic restrictions lead to a misallocation of resources, 
                                                 
6
 For alternative theories of the state, see  Pitelis (1994) and North et al. (2006). 
7
 See “Forging ahead” in The Economist, 21st of April 2012. See also McFadden (2012). 
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through structural market failures and engender “welfare losses” due to monopoly, which 
need to be removed through CP. This focus on resource misallocation and static “welfare 
losses” fails to account for differences in efficiency, such as resources and capabilities, 
between firms. Such differences can involve differential innovations, ability to reduce 
transaction costs and dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007). In reality, it is recognised that it is 
unlikely that markets will be perfectly competitive or contestable (Dixit, 1982). Moreover, 
the assumption that technology, innovation and capabilities are constant, or simply linked to 
the type of market structure (Scherer and Ross, 1990), is a major limitation that has been well 
rehearsed in literature and will not detain us further here (see Pitelis, 1991; Jorde and Teece, 
1992).  
 
The dominance of the neoclassical view on CP and IP, is currently under question, in part as 
a result of the emergence and popularity of the evolutionary, resource, capabilities, 
knowledge and systems-based views, which we have already mentioned in the previous 
section. This encompasses the diverse group of contributions we discussed, all of which share 
the view that competition should not be seen as a type of market structure, but rather as a 
process of rivalry sometimes combined with collusive behaviour (Cowling, 1982) and often 
characterised by “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942). Moreover, proponents of this 
perspective share the view that the classical focus on value and wealth creation, realisation 
and distribution are important objectives of economics, and that these cannot be achieved 
merely through efficiency in resource allocation (Pitelis, 2009b). There is also a widespread 
belief that firms are important contributors to value and wealth creation, that each firm is an 
individual entity, which differs from other firms in terms of its distinct resources, capabilities, 
knowledge and learning potential, and that big business competition can help foster value and 
wealth creation (Cimoli et al., 2009). 
 
As noted, the lineage of this perspective includes the classical and post-Keynesian 
economists, as well as scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter (1942), and more recently Edith 
Penrose (1959), George Richardson (1972), and Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter 
(1982). Its focus on evolution, knowledge and innovation, and institutions, as well as its 
“systemic” (as opposed to just market-failure), are arguably fashioning a major shift in CP 
and IP in some policy circles, notably the European (Nubler, 2011) – our focus in the next 
subsection, and also the OECD (Warwick, 2013) and recently Britain (Foresight, 2013). 
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Implications of the evolutionary, resource and systems-based perspective for CP and IP 
include the need for a broader welfare criterion than maximisation of consumer surplus 
(Mahoney et al., 2009), and that superior capabilities can provide another efficiency-based 
reason for industrial concentration/consolidation and large firm size. In addition, viewing 
competition as a dynamic process of creative (or less creative) destruction through innovation 
implies the need to account for the determinants of innovation, when considering the effects 
of “monopoly”. Last, but not least, competition with cooperation (or “co-opetition”), as in 
Richardson (1972), implies the need to account for the potential productivity benefits of co-
opetition when devising anti-trust policy (Jorde and Teece, 1992). 
 
While engaging more with the neoclassical perspective, and without much recognition of the 
literature summarised above, more recent work by more eclectic scholars such as Rodrik 
(2009), Hausmann et al. (2011), and Aghion et al (2011), also emphasize the need for IP, 
when there exist information asymmetries, missing inputs and coordination failures – 
virtually always!  In this context, Stiglitz (2011), pointed to a need to promote learning across 
the board, thereby creating a learning-based economy. This supports earlier ideas by 
Cambridge school scholars, such as Luigi Pasinetti, (see Pasinetti 2009; Pitelis, 2012c).  
More recently Warwick (2013) proposed moving beyond earlier approaches to IP towards  
one that aims to help build systems, networks and institutions, as well as to align strategic 
priorities. All these point to an emerging consensus that DIPs matter much more than 
originally acknowledged by neoclassical theory. As the conservative British PM David 
Cameron has put it, government is involved with industry anyway, so we better focus on how 
to improve this involvement (Pitelis, 2011), rather than keep debating its existence. Foresight 
(2013) moves in this direction.  In recent years, moreover European policy makers have also 
recognised the importance of a DIP. We examine this below. 
 
IIc. The Case of European IP 
 
The neoclassical economics perspective has helped shape CP and IP thinking in Europe for 
many decades. The original Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome on the acquisition and 
abuse of monopoly power are apparently informed by the IO perspective on the welfare 
losses of monopoly, in that they express concern with the impact on consumer prices of 
concentrated market structures. However, European practice has diverged from theory. A 
notable example is the “national champions” or “picking winners” policy, which was pursued 
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by various European countries in the 1960s and 1970s.  Much like in the case of Japan, this 
involved identifying potentially successful sectors and firms, and employing measures such 
as subsidies and tax breaks to promote them. It also involved an encouraging attitude towards 
mergers, as well as the nationalisation of utilities and other industries perceived to be 
“strategic”. For example, the post-World War II French experience resembled  Japan, in that 
it involved a close relationship between government and business and a readiness to 
nationalize certain enterprises,  in order to  foster national champions in oligopolistic, 
technology and capital intensive industries, (Friendson, 1997). In Italy and Spain too, 
government assistance was common (Chandler et al., 1997). In Germany, large enterprises 
received support from the German banks, in what became known as “Rhenish Capitalism” 
(Wengenroth, 1997). Similar was the case of Britain (Pitelis, 1994; Pitelis and Kelmendi, 
2009), and indeed, with its own specific characteristics, that of the USA (Best, 1990).). 
Evidently, all these were inconsistent with the pursuit of “perfect competition”. 
 
The “national champions” policy was also pursued at a Europe-wide level, in the search for 
European companies, which could out-compete large American multinationals (Bianchi and 
Labory, 2006). In some cases, such policies blunted incentives for protected firms to 
innovate, and gave rise to “problematic enterprises”, or as British PM Margaret Thatcher 
called them “lame ducks”. On the other hand, certain sectors and companies, like commercial 
aircraft (e.g. Airbus) and cars, have evidently benefited from such IPs. Nevertheless, in the 
1980s, European governments, led by Mrs Thatcher, resorted to deregulation and 
privatisation, as well as a shift of focus to SMEs and entrepreneurship, in an avowed attempt 
to roll back the state, with rather mixed results (Clarke and Pitelis, 1994).  European policy at 
the time, chose to emphasise so called “horizontal measures”, such as education, innovation, 
improved infrastructure and public sector efficiency, without targeting particular firms, or 
sectors (Pitelis, 2007). 
 
As noted, the rise of the BRICs and “State Capitalism”8, alongside the more recent 
predicament of the European economy (Pitelis, 2012a), has led to the return of the IP and the 
“manufacturing matters” debate in Europe. Several European Commission (EC) documents, 
released since 2002, are noteworthy in this regard. All of them employ explicitly the term IP 
and have a manufacturing focus. This in itself is significant. 
                                                 
8
 See The Economist Special Issue on “The rise of State Capitalism”, 21st January 2012. 
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Focusing on the main post-2000 documents, EC (2002) was an important landmark, in that it 
departed from the earlier focus on “horizontal measures” and the rather arm’s length 
approach to the industry versus services debate. More specifically, the major themes in EC 
(2002) were that industry matters; horizontal policy measures need to be applied in response 
to specific sectoral needs; and that policy needs to contribute to competitiveness. In addition, 
the document suggested that enlargement is seen as an opportunity and that (environmental) 
sustainability is key.  Building on this, the objective of the EC (2004) document was for IP to 
accompany the process of industrial change-deindustrialisation, with proposed “actions” that 
included a “regulation framework”, “synergies of policies” and a “sectoral dimension”.  
 
More recently the   EC (2010) communication proposed an integrated industrial policy for the 
globalisation era that aims to put competitiveness and sustainability centre stage.  EC (2011),  
aptly entitled “Industrial Policy: Reinforcing competitiveness”, placed emphasis on industrial 
change, innovative industry, a business-friendly environment for industry and services, and 
support for SMEs, and environmental sustainability. The closely related EC (2010a), “new 
growth strategy” emphasized the need for a smart, inclusive and sustainable growth that relies 
on “open coordination” and leveraging local knowledge, but also the benefits from central 
coordination.  More recent talk and EC conferences refer explicitly to re-industrialisation 
with an eye to a more balanced diversified European economy. 
 
The importance of a systemic view, industry, the reversing of “deindustrialisation”, 
international “competitiveness”, the “sectoral dimension”, synergies of policies, regulation, 
environmental and energy sustainability, and the challenges of globalisation in the intangible 
assets-based economy, are widely acknowledged without the neoclassical camp; see Edquist 
(2005), Lundvall (2007). In the above context, the EU-advocated policies in the new 
millennium are more in line than before with the evolutionary/resource/system-based view 
and, in the view of this author, represent a move in the right direction. It is unfortunate that 
the recent crisis threatens to undermine this by fostering protectionism and introversion 
(WTO, 2012). Having said this, even at its best, there is scope for European IP has to pay 
more attention to business strategy-informed actions that foster the sustainable 
appropriation/capture of value and wealth, as opposed to the creation of value through 
efficiency, as well as to the issue of system-wide economic sustainability. The next section 
proposes a strategy for European sustainable reindustrialisation and competitiveness that 
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builds on our earlier discussion and aims to address these limitations, paying particular 
attention to the requisite conditions for fostering system-wide economic sustainability. 
 
 
III. TOWARDS A BUSINESS-POLICY-INFORMED STRATEGY FOR EUROPEAN 
REINDUSTRIALISATION AND SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVENESS 
  
As already noted, both neoclassical, post-Keynesian and system-based evolutionary 
economics paid almost exclusive emphasis on value creation, failed to adequately discuss the 
issues of value creation and capture, and hence ignored the interrelationship between the two 
and how this impacts the system-wide economic sustainability. In order to embed our 
proposed strategy for sustainable international competitiveness within a coherent alternative 
framework, we propose below first, a synthesis that brings together elements from both the 
neoclassical and classical views. Following on from this we propose a business-strategy-
informed DIP, based on an integration of some commonly perceived as contradictions in 
extant debates on DIPs, that pays attention to sustainable system-wide value co-creation and 
value capture.  
   
IIIa. The Nature and Determinants of Value and Wealth Creation-A Meta-Classical Synthesis 
 
The nature and determinants of “value” and wealth creation, realisation and distribution, were 
at the heart of classical economic thinking, in the likes of Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo 
(1817), and Karl Marx (1959). Dobb (1973) and Robinson (1962) provided critical accounts 
and made important contributions of their own. Dobb, for example has observed that both 
major theories of value, the classical “labour theory” and the neoclassical marginal utility-
based one, can help co-determine value creation. Joan Robinson famously called all value 
theories “metaphysical”, more articles of faith than the result of rigorous scientific 
investigation.  Nowadays, it is indeed more conventional to talk in terms of value added than 
value in general, and wealth creation, rather than value creation.  Yet, we believe that a quick 
excursion on the nature and theories, as well as determinants, of value is not without its own 
value, not least because value added already includes the word “value” to start with.   
 
From the point of view of the individual economic agent, “value” can be defined as perceived 
worthiness of a product or service to the (potential and/or target) beneficiary. This is usually 
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socially co-perceived and co-created (Pitelis, 2009a). Value added is the additional value 
conferred to a product or service by an economic agent, such as an individual, a firm, a 
sector, or a nation.  It is potential before users have been convinced and/or are able to pay a 
market price to purchase the product or service, and it is realized once the product or service 
is purchased. Value added may never be realized, if consumers lack the power to purchase 
the product or service (effective demand). Moreover, an economic agent, such as a firm, may 
fail to appropriate/capture a significant share of aggregate realised value, if outcompeted by 
rivals who possess substitute products and/or superior advantages, such as complementary 
assets and capabilities; see Teece (1986). This renders important the discussion of value 
realization and value appropriation/capture. 
 
In general, value added is engendered through increased efficiency and/or productivity, 
including efficiency in resource allocation, hence a reduction of the cost of production, and/or 
an increase in the perceived utility-worthiness of the product or service through 
“differentiation”. This can be due to increased functionality and/or aesthetic appeal, or to 
“imaginary” factors, achieved, for example, through advertising. There are long debates on 
these issues in IO and business strategy (see Tirole, 1988; Grant, 2005; Cowling, 2006); 
often, real and imaginary elements coexist, and it is arguable that through innovation, cost 
reductions and product differentiation can take place simultaneously. Apple products are a 
case in point, in that they are cheaply produced in China but attract high margins as a result 
of aesthetic appeal but also sophisticated value capture strategies. Steve Jobs famously stated 
in The Lost Interview that from his early days with Apple his problem was to deal with 
Marx’s problem of the “realisation of value”! 
 
Drawing on extant theory of economics and management, it can be argued that four major 
factors interact to explain value-added at the firm level: firm strategy and infra-structure 
(Chandler, 1960); unit cost economies/increasing returns to scale (eg Young, 1928; Kaldor, 
1970), specialised resources (notably human) and their capabilities (e.g., Penrose, 1959; 
Teece, 2007), and technology and innovativeness (e.g., Schumpeter, 1942). An attractive 
property of these four factors is that they are scalable to the meso (region, industry, sector), 
and macro-economic levels when appropriately defined, hence allowing a relatively smooth 
aggregation, based on firm-level foundations (Pitelis, 1998, 2009a). For example, one can 
talk in terms of the sectoral, regional and nation-wide strategy and structure, unit costs 
economies, system of innovation and human resources and capabilities. This scaling up 
 18 
property is missing from other works, including that of Porter, whose business-level strategy 
focused on reductions of the forces of competition and “positioning” (Porter, 1985), with no 
apparent link to his subsequent “Diamond” framework (Pitelis and Vasilaros, 2010). On the 
other hand, however, we claim below that ideas from strategy, including those of Porter can 
be of import to the DIP debate. 
 
The determinants of value added impact mostly on potential value, not realized-captured 
value, with the exception of business strategies for profitability/value capture. In business 
economics and strategy, there are extensive discussions on strategies for value 
realization/capture. These include integration (horizontal and vertical), diversification, and 
cooperation strategies; “generic strategies”; entry deterrence strategies (through strategic or 
technological-“innocent” barriers to entry); and “firm-level 
differentiation/heterogeneity/branding” strategies (Pitelis, 2009a). 
 
It is arguable, that strategies for value realization and capture are scalable to the meso- and 
nation-wide levels too. For example, countries can use strategic trade/protectionist policies. 
They may adopt regional/national differentiation-branding strategies by strengthening, and/or 
engendering and promoting their comparative advantages. In some cases, de-integration 
strategies are adopted (for example the integration of Germany or the de-integration of 
countries from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere).  Co-operation strategies, often in the 
context of regional associations of countries, such as the EU, NAFTA or ASEAN, are 
common. Generic strategies are also of relevance to nations, which may aim, or happen to be, 
cost leaders (e.g. China in manufacturing, India in IT services), differentiators (e.g. French 
and Italian design), or niche players, for example, Switzerland in banking and/or watches. 
More complex cases can involve elements of niche (cost leadership and/or product 
differentiation), in specific activities, as for example recently Britain in luxury cars. In 
addition, such strategies can be partly historically determined, partly the result of policy 
initiatives, partly exogenous, or usually a combination of all these and more, including 
serendipity. Shapiro and Taylor (1990), Freeman (1995), Fagerberg et al. (2005), and Chang 
and Lin (2009) provide more extensive discussion and examples. 
 
IIIb. A  Strategy for European Reindustrialisation and Sustainable Competitiveness 
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In our definition, superior international competitiveness equates to the ability to capture co-
created value sustainably. This definition involves the words “creation” and “co-creation” of 
value, capture of value and “sustainability”. As we noted, extant literature has paid attention 
mostly to value creation. Hence our focus here will be on value co-creation, value capture 
and sustainability.  
 
With regard to value creation first, the European focus in the 1990s was on so-called 
“horizontal measures”. These are measures that cover the economy as a whole, and relate to 
the four determinants of value creation we discussed. For example, training and education 
improve human resources; tax breaks for R&D and intellectual property right protection can 
foster innovation; physical infrastructure (roads, transport, telecommunications), and a 
supporting legal and institutional as well as well as cultural context, a more efficient and 
effective public sector, can help all business to “do business”. Anti-trust/competition policies 
can foster big business competition and non-collusive co-operation that leverages increasing 
returns to scale and fosters innovation. 
  
In the above context, even horizontal measures alone can afford a huge space for the public 
sector. When done effectively they help co-create value with the private sector. This is not 
merely because of “market failure” but also because of a division of labour based on 
differential resources, skills and capabilities. The private sector does not normally run a 
police and army service, they do not have the legitimacy to legislate and tax. Calling 
“legitimacy” and “democracy” for that matter, an outcome of “market failure” would be 
rather far-fetched. Hence we submit that both market (and government) failures, and 
differential capabilities can help explain the division of labour and value co-creation between 
the two (Klein et al., 2013).  
 
Many of the aforementioned functions of the state are recognised as legitimate by free market 
champions such as Hayek (1944) who added the delineation and protection of rights, defence 
against foreign armies and even anti-trust policies based on the notion of  “planning for 
competition”. A critical question is whether DIPs can go further than that, in a way that it is 
likely to enhance the capture of co-created value in a sustainable way, whereby the 
satisfaction of an objective in the short run, does not prejudice the achievement of the same 
objective in the longer run. This presupposes economic sustainability, which at its most basic 
level is the avoidance of destructive economic crises (Pitelis, 2013). 
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In order to do this, we first try to go beyond the two apparently contradictory principles of  
DIPs,  namely market failure versus market guidance and CA-based versus CA-defying ones. 
We then revisit the manufacturing/services dichotomy and the horizontal versus vertical 
policies ones. We claim that they all involve false contradictions and that an integrated view 
on these apparent dilemmas can afford the basis for a theory-founded, minimally invasive, 
DIP that go beyond Hayek’s approved scope for public policy. On this basis, we then draw on 
business strategy in order to propose four specific ingredients of such a DIP that are in line 
with our proposed synthesis and foster sustainable international competitiveness.     
  
The first apparent “contradiction”, is the market failure versus market guidance one. We 
propose that this contradiction is false and that “market-guided market guidance” is likely to 
be a better basis for public policy. That would involve taking into account-“reading” market 
signals and help build on them whenever desirable. Moreover, when, markets are absent, 
market creation and co-creation, in a market guided way, can be a legitimate function of 
public policy and public-private-polity-based partnerships (PPPPs) (Pitelis, 2013). 
   
The second false “contradiction” is the comparative versus competitive advantages one. This 
is because the very process of economic development definitionally involves the upgrading 
and/or development of new comparative advantages. So while at any given point in time 
countries can be said to trade based on their CAs, over time their CAs shift, for various 
reasons, including chance, design or serendipity. In this context the more relevant question is 
whether the evolution of CAs should be CA-friendly or CA-defying. Since development 
involves the eventual defying of CAs, by definition, it is arguable that the best way to defy 
one’s CAs is in a CA-friendly way. This way one builds on extant strength. Of course this 
will not always be possible or desirable. In cases such as the emergence of mobile banking in 
Kenya, the CA was not there – if anything, it was the lack of a CA that triggered a radically 
new business model that changed fundamentally the face of banking in that country and more 
widely. Accordingly while our proposed “CA- friendly CA defiance” is likely to be advisable 
at most times, pure CA defiance can both work and be best in certain cases.  
 
Concerning the focus of DIP on manufacturing versus services, we have already claimed that 
manufacturing-based services (and sometimes the opposite) are likely to lead to more 
sustainable advantages, in that they are harder to imitate. This calls for economic 
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diversification based on strength and manufacturing-services bridging business model 
innovations. 
 
Concerning specific policies, we submit that the horizontal/vertical policies contradiction is 
also a false one. In most countries (especially in smaller ones) there is a limited number of 
sectors that exhibit CAs. Any horizontal measure helps these disproportionally; hence, it 
involves a vertical dimension, we can call these ‘horizontical’. In this context, some outright 
vertical policies may well help level the playing field, hence be more horizontally-friendly 
than the horizontal ones. This is in line with the recognition by the EU that horizontal policies 
should target particular sectors, but goes further in recognising that extant non-vertically-
oriented policies may well have undesirable vertical dimensions that need to be considered.   
 
Two more apparent contradictions are relevant to our discussion: first, the global/local 
contradiction, and second, the competition-cooperation ones. Concerning the former, this is 
false today in that local advantages help foster global success while with increasing 
globalisation the leveraging of globally-based advantages and opportunities is often a 
prerequisite for local presence and even survival.  Hence the issue becomes the identification 
of the ‘optimal mix’ between global and local, or glocal. 
 
The next apparent contradiction is that of competition and cooperation, both between firms 
(and nations) and between the public and the private within or between nations. Here again, 
involved to varying degrees is co-opetition. In particular, the public and the private sectors 
within an economy can both be arm’s length, and even compete (e.g., for the part of profit 
that goes to taxation), as well as cooperate, for example in the promotion of exports.  In this 
context the issue becomes the identification of the scope for co-opetitive policies that 
leverage the comparative advantages towards the achievement of a mutually satisfying 
objective.  
 
With the above in mind, we claim below that four proposed ingredients of a business-
strategy-informed DIP can foster sustainable international competitiveness, in a way that goes 
beyond Hayek’s proposed legitimate scope for state intervention, while respecting our 
proposed solutions to the apparent contradictions above. These are the following.  First, the 
identification of extant and potential comparative advantages; second, the adoption of a 
“positioning strategy”; third, the use of “vehicles”, such as regional or innovation clusters, 
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and/with appropriate inward FDI; fourth, the identification and development of “bottleneck” 
assets and capabilities in the context of specialisation within global and local value chains. 
Besides involving collaboration between the public and private sectors, the need for 
sustainability of these measures affords a critical role for the “polity” (the so called third 
sector), such as NGOs, consumer associations, public-private partnerships, clusters,  business 
ecosystems and overall “social capital” (Putnam, 1993; Moran and Ghoshal, 1999; Branston 
et al., 2006). We develop these ideas below.  
  
Much like private firms, regions and countries need to diagnose their evolving comparative 
advantages, and decide on whether they wish to “compete” on their basis or to try to develop 
new advantages, in activities, where they perceive future returns are likely to be more 
lucrative and/or sustainable. The latter can be defined as constructed, or “competitive 
advantages”.  Differently put, countries, too, may wish to diagnose what Penrose (1959) 
called “productive opportunity”- the dynamic interaction between their internal resources and 
competencies, and the external opportunities and threats. Sometimes, potential future 
advantages are latent and hard to identify, in some cases they exist only in the minds of some 
entrepreneur, or even bureaucrat. Take for example the case of Mr Toyoda (the founder of the 
Toyota company), who diversified from textiles to cars, despite the lack of any obvious link 
between the two, thereby laying the foundations of the Japanese miracle. The desired mix of 
comparative and competitive advantages for each country requires in-depth investigation, and 
cannot be decided on a priori grounds and without analysis on the ground.  Our argument is 
that this process of CA defiance should be as much as possible CA friendly, while the 
resultant market guidance, should be market guided. It can often involve market creation and 
co-creation. The informational and capability requirements for the private sector alone 
(especially the smaller firms) can be far too high for it to deal with this without government 
collaboration, hence the CA-friendly defiance of extant CAs through market guided market 
guidance and co-creation, is a legitimate function of government and indeed of polity (the 
“third sector”), given its local knowledge on the ground.  
 
Once the comparative or competitive advantages have been diagnosed, selected and (in the 
case of competitive ones) co-constructed, another decision can involve the country’s 
“positioning” (Pitelis, 2009b). Countries, like firms, could aim to position themselves along a 
relative to other countries cost-relative differentiation (“image”) spectrum. These can be high 
or low. The best position to be in is low relative cost/high relative differentiation-”image”. 
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This is normally the case of countries with a high innovation culture and performance – with 
strong “systems of innovation”, so to speak. This allows them to simultaneously reduce costs 
(through organizational and institutional innovation), and produce products, services and an 
“image” (country differentiation-branding) of a leader, an innovator, a “quality” player. Small 
Scandinavian European players such as Sweden and Denmark are cases in point; see Freeman 
(1995), Fagerberg et al. (2005). 
 
Countries with high relative costs and low differentiation produce expensive goods and 
services, and the image of the country is of low quality. High relative costs can be due to low 
innovative capability, poor infrastructure, lack of increasing returns and/or a weak 
organizational and institutional configuration. Greece in the 1990s is such an example. 
Despite her apparent “competitiveness” in terms of growth rates of GDP, well in excess of 
other European countries, that was not built on supply-side foundations, and was not 
sustainable  (Pitelis, 2012b). 
 
Countries with high costs and high differentiation are likely to be developed, with high 
technical and operational competencies, but without a strong innovation system. They can 
have relatively high labour costs, as a result of distributional and welfare policies. The lack of 
innovative capabilities can be an outcome of organisational and institutional sclerosis, and 
path dependence – doing already proven things in proven ways. The lack of curiosity and 
innovation could result in a “stuck in the middle”/question-mark position. It is likely to 
characterize developed economies that have relinquished their incentive and capability to 
innovate. Germany in the 1990s was a case in point.
9
  
 
Low relative cost - low relative differentiation countries are also “stuck in the middle”, but 
are likely to be at an earlier stage of their development – perhaps these are transition or 
emerging economies. Here, unit costs can be low because of very cheap labour and resource 
costs, but there is also a lack of differentiation/comparative or competitive advantages, that 
places them in that category. Eastern European transition economies are cases in point 
(Cowling and Tomlinson, 2011).  
 
                                                 
9
 See interview of G. Schröder by R. Zhong in The Wall Street Journal, published on July 9
th, 2012, titled “The 
man who rescued the German economy”. 
 24 
The relative costs/differentiation framework can help countries identify ways to improve their 
competitiveness by reducing unit costs, improving differentiation, and strengthening their 
innovation capabilities. A small country, for instance, with good climate, low costs of labour 
and limited manufacturing capabilities, can aim to achieve high country differentiation (for 
instance, in specialised, quality tourism), with good service (which need not require much 
higher costs, if brought about through culture and education), and low costs. Countries with 
human resources that possess ample time to spare due to lack of employment opportunities, 
could aim to achieve differentiation through emphasising service provision, e.g. call centres, 
IT services etc. These are “niche-differentiation” strategies, more appropriate for countries 
which cannot pursue an across-the-board differentiation strategy (Shapiro and Taylor, 1990).  
 
The idea of positioning is due to Porter (1985). When applied to the case of nations, 
positioning involves naturally market guided market guidance, CA-friendly CA-defiance and 
PPPP-based co-opetition, not least because the informational, capability and incentive-related 
requirements for the market or private sector alone to achieve, or even aim for, this, is simply 
not there. Simply put, nation-wide positioning requires institutional and regulatory structures 
that are without the brief of markets and/or firms but are within the brief of the public, 
sometimes the polity, and hence of PPPP-based DIPs.  
 
A third ingredient of a business strategy-informed IS involves “vehicles” through which 
supply-side structural international competitiveness can be improved.  By “vehicles” we refer 
mainly to the inward foreign direct investment (FDI), and agglomerations of firms and related 
organisations such as clusters, business ecosystems, and special economic zones (EZs). 
Independently and when pursued together, these can foster productivity and competitiveness 
(Porter, 1990; Pitelis, 2009a). The sustainability of such competitiveness requires 
embeddedness. This means that countries should aim to create linkages between a local 
production base, and FDI, so that FDI does not “fly” when conditions change, e.g. costs 
increase.    
      
Besides positioning and branding, it is important for business, regions and nations, to 
specialize within emergent global value chains-production systems and/or create (segments 
of) their own locally-based ones to the extent possible, in a way that places them in the 
position of “bottleneck” players/assets (those whose contribution to the final product is most 
critical), so that they can capture the biggest part possible of the globally co-created pie 
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(UNCTAD, 2012). For example, despite her recent success in luxury cars, Britain still only 
captures a small part of the value added, as a result of “bottleneck” inputs, which she buys in. 
10
 Identifying this challenge and helping to address it by bringing into the country the 
production of such parts, can be one solution. Once again the institutional, regulatory, 
incentive and resource-capability bases of the market and (even very big) firms are not 
normally available, and/or within their remit, hence public policy and PPPPs of the type we 
advocated here can be of help.    
 
The four ingredients should be considered simultaneously. Competitive advantages could be 
linked to the positioning, clusters and business ecosystems should be diagnosed and upgraded 
and FDI attracted, in a way that is in line with advantages and supports the pursued 
positioning.  Bottleneck assets and capabilities should be identified and leveraged in the 
context of specialisation within advantages-compatible segments of global value chains.
11
 
What is advantages-compatible, is often beyond the capabilities and resources, even the 
radar, of many firms, especially SMEs. The public sector can therefore be critical in funding 
the requisite research and disseminating the information and knowledge to whoever can 
benefit from it.  It can act as a “public entrepreneur” (Klein et al., 2010, 2013).  
 
Concerning adaptation, advantages and positioning should be reviewed regularly to ensure 
consistency with evolving circumstances/stages of development. For example, in order to 
attract high knowledge intensive FDI, it may be useful to discourage some FDI, e.g. by 
rendering such FDI expensive to firms, through a high-wage policy – as pursued by 
Singapore (Pitelis, 1994; Lall, 2000). Care should be taken to achieve a coincidence between 
what Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), require in their quest to leverage locational 
advantages, and what the country considers consistent with its advantages/positioning 
strategy. Such policies may become important, in an era of “fragmentation” (Venables, 
2003), where MNEs can slice the value-chain and choose “optimal” locations for each part of 
their production process. SMEs can, in this context, aim to specialise in “bottleneck” parts, 
which are outside the radar or interest of the “giants”, but of importance to their own 
objectives. Germany’s “Mittelstand” (its highly specialised advanced manufacturing SMEs), 
                                                 
10
 John Leech, in The Economist, published on November 17
th
 2012, “The motor industry: Taking the high-
road”. 
11
 The requisite conditions for achieving these are not easy, and are arguably becoming more stringent for 
developing countries, (Boltho and Allsopp 1987; Stiglitz, 2001; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002; Chang, 2002; 
Nolan et al., 2008). At the same time specialisation in segments of global value chains, can to provide some 
scope for smart, agile and effective DIPs (UNCTAD, 2012). 
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and more recently Britain’s aptly named “Middlandstand”, are cases in point. Such moves 
often require public-private collaboration, hence DIPs, at the very least through the provision 
of intelligence and advice by the government. This is now recognised widely, even 
enthusiastically embraced. The Economist (21
st
 September 2013) recently citess the case of 
the “High-Value Manufacturing Catapult” outside Coventry as a case of public-private-polity 
(University, in this case) collaboration, championed by the coalition government in the UK, 
alongside a series of other interventionist measures, see also Foresight (2013).. 
 
 
In the above context our question is, how does Europe fare, and what can be done to foster 
European sustainable international competitiveness? As noted in Section III, theoretically, 
European IP seems to be moving in the right direction. The 2010 and 2011 communications 
recognize the need for Europe to improve her system-wide productivity and competitiveness, 
reverse de-industrialisation and promote green technologies. They acknowledge the need to 
coordinate policies at the EU level, between EU nations (the “open coordination method”). 
This involves information exchange for the identification and adoption of good practice 
(Bianchi and Labory, 2011). The June 2010 communication by the EC that proposes the 
growth strategy to 2020, moreover, states that “Europe can succeed, if it acts collectively, as 
a Union” (EC, 2010, p.3).  
 
On the other hand, when looking at the European political elites’ brinkmanship vis-á-vis 
Greece (G) and the PIIS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain), one might be tempted to believe 
that profligate PIIGS is Europe’s only current concern (Pitelis, 2012b). That the “Lisbon 
strategy”, which aimed to turn Europe as a whole into the world’s most knowledge-intensive 
economy by 2010, has by now become an embarrassment seems conveniently forgotten. It is 
unclear, how Europe’s “new growth strategy” for years 2010-2020, that replaced the Lisbon 
strategy, and is meant to be “smart”, “sustainable”, “inclusive”, based on knowledge and 
innovation, while preserving the environment and ensuring social cohesion (EC, 2010), tallies 
with the current austerity measures imposed on the PIIGS. Forgotten is also the fact that the 
European project was as much political, as it was economic. It involved international 
collaborations for peace and a social democratic model that could deliver the goods to its 
citizens in an inclusive, fair way. A focus on economic competitiveness alone endangers this. 
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In line with our analysis so far, a business-strategy-informed European IS for sustainable 
rejuvenation and international competitiveness should leverage Europe’s capabilities to create 
and co-create global value, and to capture as high a share of this as possible. This can be 
achieved through the adoption of the four ingredients discussed above. Capturing co-created 
value in a sustainable way, through the co-creation of sustainable clusters and business 
ecosystems, and the adoption of requisite positioning and specialisation in global and local 
value chains strategies can be seen as a new rationale for DIPs-IS. In this context, Europe 
could aim to position herself as a “region” characterised by “value for money” products and 
services (“relatively high quality” – “relatively low costs”), that specialises in bottleneck 
assets, such as advanced manufacturing products and services. At the moment, with the 
exception of Germany, and to a lesser extent Britain, Europe as a whole seems to be “stuck in 
the middle”. Europe needs to pursue a strategy for rejuvenation for the bloc as a whole, not 
just its core or more advanced players. This requires genuine developmental support to the 
less favoured regions, not just bailouts (Pitelis, 2012a). It also poses additional challenges, 
discussed below. Moreover, while it is arguable that increases in labour costs, alongside 
investments by BRICs in the manufacturing sector of the old industrial countries (as for 
example the car industry in Britain), can assist Europe’s re-industrialisation efforts (see 
McFadden, 2012), such trends can be leveraged more effectively, if embedded within a 
wider, well thought-out and coherent strategy. 
 
As noted, a rejuvenation strategy requires reindustrialisation and locally-based 
manufacturing. Innovations take place in R&D labs, but mostly on the ground, by people who 
do things. Practice makes perfect, and this induces innovation. The loss of production 
capabilities, eventually, can also mean loss of innovation capabilities (Pisano and Shih, 
2009). Information and support by the state can involve possible advantages-compatible 
segments of global and local value chains, bottleneck assets-parts, and the targeting of 
diversification to new markets, such as the BRICs. A reindustrialisation strategy, 
additionally, requires supporting demand. This comes from consumption, investment, public 
deficits, and exports. In today’s era of deficits, debts and austerity, exports are the main route 
to sustaining demand. In this context, Europe needs to target the emerging world markets and 
help to co-develop them. She also needs realistic exchange rates, which in turn require 
political and organisational leadership.  
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Concerning productivity, this can increase when output goes up, or when employment goes 
down! Unemployment is arguably Europe’s most pressing challenge, especially in the South 
and among the young, where 50% cent figures no longer raise eyebrows (Pitelis, 2012b). A 
knowledge-based economy need not generate sufficient numbers of new jobs. For example, 
in 2010 in the US, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Cisco, Google and Amazon, created fewer 
jobs than the mid-size Kroger supermarkets. In the past 50 years, while labour productivity 
increased fourfold, the productivity of materials increased twofold, and the productivity of 
energy increased by only 20% (Milberg et al., 2012). This does not bode well with 
employment prospects. Jobless competitiveness, however, is Hamlet without the Prince of 
Denmark – it is short-term and undermines future competitiveness through the dissipation of 
skills and capabilities, as well as organisational knowledge and the ability to learn. Active 
labour market policies by the government in collaboration with intra-firm apprentices (as in 
Germany), can be of the essence. A cultural mindset that promotes entrepreneurship among 
the youth is important. This needs education, institutions and the right culture, as well as 
incentive structure and enabling policies – hence DIP. 
  
It is important to state that our suggested DIP is not about “picking winners”. It is about co-
creating the conditions that facilitate the emergence of winners, but also their challengers, 
competitors, complementors, suppliers and consumers. Policies that appropriate co-created 
value in a sustainable way also help to increase global value added. Appropriating as much of 
the co-created value, as possible, in this context, is not at the expense of other nations. These 
can pursue similar policies, thereby fostering further global value added. The important 
proviso is that value appropriation is not achieved by restraining competition, through 
monopolistic practices and/or protectionist policies. When this is the case, the “game” 
becomes zero- or even negative-sum. Sustainability, moreover, requires respecting the 
sources of future growth – the new generations and the environment. This calls for the 
mitigation of negative externalities and the promotion of positive ones, in a way that 
acknowledges the importance of transaction costs (Coase, 1960), but also the productivity 
advantages of innovative forms of societal cooperation (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
The mitigation of negative externalities and the promotion of positive ones, in turn, poses the 
challenge of free riding (Olson, 1971). Sustainable value co-creation requires the 
minimisation of shirking, which shirking can be fostered by concentrated, embedded power 
structures and relations between economic agents, such as firms, governments, and 
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sometimes NGOs. While there is no fool proof solution to this problem, it is at least arguable 
that diversity and pluralism can foster mutual monitoring and help mitigate it, at least in part. 
In this context, Europe should aim to leverage the comparative advantages of the private and 
the public sectors, as well as the “polity”. The public sector, for example, can be best for the 
provision of “general purpose technologies”, “public goods” and legitimacy, the creation of 
laws, institutions and regulation. Private entrepreneurs can be best in commercialisation and 
value capture. The “polity” can help provide “social capital” and cohesion, and promote 
sustainability (Pitelis, 2013). 
 
Implementing our proposed strategy requires requisite infrastructure, institutions and 
authorities, governance structures, attitudes, values, ideology and culture (North, 1981). This 
is a challenge in general, and for Europe in particular. Implementing any strategy requires 
coordination. As in business, the overall vision and culture, as well as resource and 
contingency planning, is set at the top. Unlike small and relatively authoritarian states, 
Europe involves many nations and lacks a central co-ordinating authority. It is partly for this 
reason that the relatively sophisticated communications by the EC are often ignored, even 
unbeknown to some member states (as the author’s own experience as a policy maker and 
President of a public sector organisation of a EU country testifies). This requires steps to 
disseminate the strategy and the provision of incentives to adapt it to local conditions and 
support with implementation capabilities. It also requires an allowance for “policy space” for 
member states to experiment, while respecting the wider constraints imposed (such as state 
aid), or argue against these, when appropriate.  
 
Another co-ordination challenge involves different General Directorates at the EC. An 
example from the author’s experience involved DG16 (regional policy), promoting clusters, 
with DG competition claiming that clusters contravene European CP. While the idea of “open 
co-ordination” is attractive and commendable, it poses implementation challenges that need 
to be acknowledged and addressed.  Progress in this direction is likely to be slow. It may well 
require bold measures, such as the setting-up of an independent Europe-wide authority, 
responsible for devising a strategy for sustainable competitiveness and overseeing its 
implementation. Such an authority could co-ordinate and aim to integrate all European 
policies. It could collaborate with member states’ similarly independent authorities, to adapt 
and implement it. To avoid an ever expanding central bureaucracy, both the Europe-wide and 
member state organisations could represent an evolution of existing ones and could be staffed 
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with existing resources from related authorities. For example, already existing independent 
competition authorities in member states could serve this purpose.  
 
Despite implementation and co-ordination challenges, such “top-down/bottom-up strategies”, 
are feasible and have been implemented elsewhere and in Europe. A case in point are the 
policies adopted by the German government in the early 1990s under the leadership of 
Gerhard Schroder, which involved centrally co-ordinated, yet in agreement with the trade 
unions, restrained wage rate increases, alongside apprenticeships.  These were anticipatory 
and proactive, and aimed to address emerging competitiveness challenges. Quite 
independently of their scope and possible ideological objections, they help highlight the 
feasibility of a DIP for sustainable European competitiveness as a whole. Current British 
policy is arguably a step in the right direction. 
 
Our proposed DIP goes beyond extant approaches, and can contribute towards the 
rejuvenation of “old Europe”. However, “globalisation” and an emergent “winner takes all” 
ideology and practice can prejudice its potential success. These have now facilitated an 
unprecedented income re-distribution in favour of the well-off within nations, placing 
pressure on demand and undermining the abilities of governments to balance their books 
(Atkinson and Morelli, 2011). For the first time in the history of capitalism, the top 0.01% of 
the population appropriates circa 5% of global co-created value. 
12
  
 
The emergent concentration and embeddedness of such power structures help to foster overly 
cosy relations between business, governments, and media that help to take challenging issues 
off the agenda. Dis-enfranchised groups abstain from the political arena, helping lead to 
parliamentary democracies that are thinly veiled oligarchies. All these have led to, and are 
being exacerbated by, the current crisis. The sustainability of the system is now under 
question. Major investors, including Warren Buffet, call for capitalism to be saved from 
(greedy) banks and capitalists, asking for them to be taxed, as U.S. President Obama put it, as 
much as their secretaries!  As Zingales (2011) observes, meritocracy and social mobility are 
retreating in the US and everywhere. The coincidence of personal and corporate corruption 
renders the problems of many countries virtually insurmountable (Pitelis, 2012a). 
Neoclassical economic theory is of little, if any, help here. Ronald Coase has recently echoed 
Keynes’ plea to save capitalism from capitalists, with a new call to save Economics from the 
                                                 
12
 See, the Special report on The Economist, 13
th
 of October 2012, “For richer, for poorer”, by Z. M. Beddoes. 
 31 
economists (Coase, 2012)!  Our proposed DIP offers little relief to such challenges.  What we 
propose is necessary and possible, but requires no less than a revamp of the system, a re-
invention and rejuvenation of “old Europe” and of capitalism, as a whole. This is beyond our 
scope here, but sees Cowling and Tomlinson (2011) and Pitelis (2013), for some thoughts. 
 
In the above context, it is also beyond the scope of this paper, and the space available, to 
discuss further precise policy measures. These should be based, as a minimum, on the public 
policies acknowledged as necessary by Hayek (whose pro-market sentiments nobody ever 
questioned), and draw on our principles, focus, and business strategy-informed suggested 
actions and vehicles, based on a detailed analysis on the ground and in collaboration with 
those closer to the action, in the context of the overall strategic framework provided here.    
 
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS 
 
We suggested that a meta-classical approach to sustainable international competitiveness 
should marry efficient resource allocation with resource creation, and involve the 
identification and adoption of governance structures that allow sustainable competitiveness 
not to be undermined by the pursuit of sectional interests and embedded power structures. 
 
We claimed that European rejuvenation and international competitiveness could be achieved 
through a DIP that learns from business strategy and involves a value capture and a value co- 
creation aspect, usually lacking in the predominantly macro-economic approaches. The 
conceptual basis behind such a DIP involve an integration of some commonly perceived 
“dichotomies”, notably market failure versus guidance, CA defiance versus CA-following, 
manufacturing versus services, horizontal versus vertical policies, competition versus 
cooperation, global versus local, and a top-down versus bottom-up approach. We argued for a 
“top-down/bottom up” approach that involves market-guided market guidance, creation and 
co-creation, CA-friendly CA defiance, with “horizontical” measures that involve co-opetition 
and manu-services in the context of glocal value chains and production systems.   
 
Within this general context, ingredients of such a DIP include the diagnosis of comparative 
and the co-construction of competitive advantages, the adoption of positioning strategies, the 
co-creation of clusters, markets and ecosystems, the specialisation in global value chains and 
the creation and specialisation in local production systems/value chains through the 
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acquisition and adoption of bottleneck positions in such systems/chains. These can be 
achieved by leveraging the comparative advantages and capabilities of the public, private and 
“third” sectors (polity). It requires appropriate implementation and co-ordination 
mechanisms, which is a challenge in general and especially in the context of a multi-country 
entity, such as the EU. Setting up an independent, Europe-wide organization that places 
“sustainable competitiveness” at the centre-stage of its agenda could be one step towards 
addressing such challenges, but not a panacea (among others, such organisations are 
sometimes easier to be captured by special interests, or even engender co-capture).  
 
Current EC communications on EU IP represent a step in the right direction, but need to be 
better informed by business strategy and pay more attention to the impact of power structures 
on policies for sustainable global value creation. European CP should aim to enhance 
competition through innovation by thwarting anti-competitive practices and fostering new 
firm creation and growth, as well as new market and ecosystem creation and co-creation. 
Member states (especially the more developed ones) should refrain from “strategic trade” 
policies. Pluralism and diversity, through the creation and growth of the “polity”, should be 
encouraged, in order to engender mutual stewardship and monitoring. This, in practical terms, 
aims to eliminate “regulatory capture”, rent-seeking and corruption by all, especially by the 
more powerful constituents.  
 
Our proposed DIP can help. Its scope for implementation and success, however, depends on 
wider challenges and constraints. These require a wider debate on the future of Europe and 
capitalism, as a whole. As conventionally put, this, however, is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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